Public services often leave capacity unused while demand goes unmet. I exploit the staggered, legally mandated rollout of a digital platform that replaced Chile's paper-based system of official communication between state entities. In the National Board of Kindergartens, adoption cuts document processing times by 70%. Documents from the units that coordinate enrollment rise, concentrated during the enrollment window, and budget and reporting documents, which reach only centers run by third parties, fall year-round. Public childcare enrollment rises by 11% over the pre-adoption mean, with no new seats, no change in applications, and no change at providers outside the reform. The increase is concentrated in centers run by third parties, which communicate with the agency through documents, and does not appear in centers the agency runs, which received the same documents but use its enrollment system instead. Three in four additional children come from the poorest 60 percent of households. The results show that adoption of the technology improved the allocation of existing resources: output rises where enrollment runs through the channel the technology reached, with personnel, incentives, and authority unchanged. I interpret this as evidence that cheaper communication raises public output where it is part of producing the service.

We quantify the distributional effects of market power by decomposing capital income into competitive returns and market-power rents and assigning these components to ultimate individual owners. Using matched firm-level and taxpayer-level administrative data for Chile from 2008 to 2016, we estimate firm-level markups and trace monopoly rents through ownership networks. Capital income is highly concentrated, but competitive returns are more skewed than market-power rents because very large firms exhibit lower markups. As a result, market-power rents account for a smaller share of income at the very top of the distribution. Inequality decompositions imply that reductions in market power lower inequality despite increases in competitive returns, as the associated rise in the labor share dominates. Our results provide new empirical evidence on how ownership structure mediates the link between market power and inequality.

We address two main questions: (i) how do firms respond to an unanticipated shock to their cash flows, and (ii) what is the role of financial constraints in mediating such response? To answer these questions, we study the behavior of Chilean firms during the 2019 social unrest, which caused a series of disruptions to the firms' activity over several months. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation in the exposure of firms to these incidents, we find that more exposed firms experience larger declines in sales, larger employment losses, and are more likely to fall behind in their financial obligations than less affected firms. Moreover, these responses are significantly stronger for those firms more likely to be financially constrained. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that constrained firms translate almost half the decline in sales into lower demand for labor and intermediate inputs, more than double the transmission of unconstrained firms.